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Showing posts with label HR Access. Show all posts
Showing posts with label HR Access. Show all posts

Tuesday, March 11, 2014

America and France: Two countries united by failed military payroll

NEW YORK
“Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori,” ancient Romans
used to say. It is not only good to die for one's country,
but payroll software requires you do it for free
Last month saw France's president pay a state visit to the United States. Among the various topics on offer for Presidents Obama and Hollande  one could mention the drop in foreign investment in France (due to the French government's idiotic policies), the impact of the NSA spying scandal (due to the US government's idiotic policies), both leaders' marital woes (alleged in Obama's case, true in the case of Hollande who regaled the nation with two First Ladies, one official, one hidden), the various crises around the world (Syria, Ukraine etc.) However, there is one topic which the two leaders probably didn't get to discuss: how their respective military failed spectacularly in implementing a payroll system for their armed forces.

The U.S. tries first... and fails first
As in so many other cases, the U.S. was a pioneer in the use of package software to run its HR and payroll operations. In the late 1990s it adopted the HR software leader of the time, PeopleSoft (which had developed a specific Federal product) to integrate over 90 different systems into a state-of-the-art HR/payroll system. Several hundreds Department of Defense (DoD) contractors  and employees worked on the project which was supposed to go live in 2006. I will spare you the the details of this soap opera which comes with epic cost overruns and deadlines missed, but suffice it to say that in 2010, that is TWELVE years after project kickoff, DIMHRS (Defense Integrated Military HR Systems as the acronym goes) was announced dead on arrival (the system integrator  was Northrop Grumman.) Oh, and it only cost $1 billion, by the way. Quite a lot for a payroll system that was never used.

The solution was...to go back to the 40-year old system (written in Cobol) and it did not fare markedly better as it results in countless payroll errors for many of the 2.7 million active-duty personnel: many soldiers get shortchanged on their pay, others get overpaid and then have to do with abrupt paycuts as DoD recoups the monies, which is hardly the best way to motivate troops who put their life on the line all over the world. In some cases deserters continue to be paid for years. Retirees who are rehired to find themselves in a bizarre situation: a glitch in the system often results in retiree records being updated to "dead" with condolence letters sent to the  family of an otherwise quite healthy soldier. This happened to none other than the U.S. Army Chief of Staff.

It is quite mind boggling that an organization like the Pentagon which uses the most sophisticated technologies in the world can be defeated by something quite humdrum as payroll software.

Where the US leads, its oldest ally, France, follows
The French military is smaller in size than its U.S. counterpart (300,000 troops half of which in the Army) but it is proportionately as maddeningly complex, if not more. As in the US every branch of the military uses a different HR/payroll system, each originally custom-built and with pleasant names such as Concerto, Rh@psodie, Symphonie. Starting around 2005 each branch decided to move to a package software based on SAP. As the below diagram shows each branch had its own version of SAP HR which was interfaced to Louvois, a new custom-made payroll system, to be replaced in 2016 by ONP, an HR Access-based payroll system for all French government employees. Unfortunately for French servicemen and taxpayers Louvois, like its US counterpart, was an unmitigated disaster. Costing north of half a billion euros, with several hundred million more in overpayments, compensation paid to tens of thousands of military families who got shortchanged and additional implementation/maintenance costs to fix the issues, the French military will probably end up paying even more than the Pentagon for the same result: a failed payroll system. At least we French have one consolation: in one area, failed military payroll projects, we outdid the Americans.  The French Minister of Defense had to recognize the failure since it was on such an epic scale and promise to build a new payroll system by the end of next year before it was to be replaced by ONP. Even the CEO of Steria, the IT company which built the system, appeared on TV for a prime-time attempt at damage control. And now the bombshell: I have it from confidential sources that even the ONP project  will be scrappped: another half a billion dollars are thus being simply thrown out the window with this second  project failure by the same government. Two spectacular HR IT  failures two years in a row. Who can say that we in France don't do things better than in the United States?






What went wrong? 
- Too many obsolete payroll and accounting systems which do not communicate with one another and HR systems. This issue has more than academic results: for instance, a soldier who is the beneficiary of payroll errors is wounded in Afghanistan and sent back to a hospital back home. According to the rules he should be forgiven all debts related to payroll errors. Except that since HR systems take for ever to be updated and when they are they are badly interfaced to payroll, our soldier finds himself without a "wounded warrior" status and he and his family have to go through unjustified financial hardships. Hardly the best way to reward someone who almost lost their life for the country.

- Absurd number of manual workaround and paper-based processes: staff data has to be written on a form, then physically sent to another location where it is manually entered into another system, by yet another employee.  In 2014, when organizations are moving their HR operations to the cloud such an antiquated way of doing business is unbelievable

- The complexity of rules, pay levels and status types in both countries is mind-boggling. In the US the multiple basic pay/entitlements/housing allowance/re-enlistment bonus often results in a soldier's pay changing several times per day. The creativity of French legislators and bureaucrats is no less astounding: for instance, the Navy pays a €300 allowance to every single mother whose child has  been recognized by one of the Republic's sailors whatever port city in the world she can be found in. Many Navy personnel have recognized up to 10 children. A senior naval officer even told me that he knows of one case where a sailor owned up to ...20 children! The French government, ever understanding (and generous with taxpayers' money) when it comes to such shenanigans, coughs up. And every payment has to comply with the tax rules of every country the child was born in. Only a particularly robust HR and payroll system  can handle such complexity. It is obvious that some rules have to change, and Congress and Parliament will have to make the necessary changes. But many processes are not mandated by law: they are just the result of a decades-long practice of using paper and manual processes. These can be streamlined much more easily, and should have been done so. Why weren't they? Incompetence is one answer, and the vested interest that system integrators have in maintaining the staus quo: after all, the more complex the requirements are, the more need there will be for customization. Here, as we have seen in other industries, what is good for an SI is not good for the customer and, ultimately the taxpayer.

- The various HR systems used do not provide for an efficient way to track personnel and allocate them swiftly. The U.S. Marines are in an altogether different one. France, as shown in the previous diagram, replicates the madness: does it really make sense to have each branch with their own SAP implementation? Wouldn't have it been much more efficient to streamline HR processes first, arrive at a common set of requirements and then implement just one instance of SAP HR for all military personnel, something they will eventually have to do. And why spend years and hundreds of millions developing Louvois if it is to be replaced, upon implementation, by yet another payroll system? The strategy does not make sense at all.

- Change resistance by  a reluctant bureaucracy and competing priorities are not helping, either. Change management was rarely given the importance it deserves, and the decision-making process was at best byzantine with defense committees and appropriations sub-committees fighting for control: this is hardly the hallmarks of success.

What to do about it? 
Although some of the issues seem to spring from the unique circumstances of government organizations, most can be encountered in any industry, regardless of size or geography. Before some start  hysterical attacks on the wastefulness of government, they should be reminded that failed IT project (whether HR or ERP) are prevalent in all industries: I know several well-known brand names whose HR systems are a shame, so let the company that has never known a failed IT project cast the first stone. However, in the case of government's failed projects one difference stands out: we taxpayers are paying for it. If a private business mismanages its HR budget, well, it's only the shareholders who are losing money; when government does, it's all of us.

- Reduce the complexity of rules. Sure, government is unique, but do you think that multinational companies that track and pay hundreds of thousands of employees (for some) across several time zones/dozens of currencies/scores of different legislations are easier to manage? If they can, whey can't Defense? When reengineering your processes, trace every requirement to a law or a policy; everything else should not be in the system. Ensure that there is a single point of contact to facilitate decision-making. When too many cooks fight in the kitchen, the result is rarely a great broth.

-Beware of requirements creep: a tendency seen in all industries, but particularly prevalent in the public sector is, in the absence of an agreement as to requirements, to revert to As-Is which undermines the whole business process reengineering exercize. Using a requirement-tracking tool is another great advantage in enhancing the quality of the requirements, something that few defense organizations do comprehensively.

- Realize that unlike wine, Cobol lines of code don't improve with age. Documentation, when available is long gone, as are those who created both. It is high time to move to the 21st century.

- Go vanilla! Eschew customization, one of the greatest ills to have been inflicted on corporate IT. The decision to go with off-the-shelf software was the right decision, however the military organizations decided to atone for it by customizing the software out of recognition (especially in France) and in the case of payroll, and some other HR functions, even use home-made software. In both the US and France, going back in time and re-adopting the old custom-made system is another grievous mistake.

- Build up your resources: government organizations tend not to be the leanest organizations with the availability of high-tech skills lagging other industries. They should set up Centers of Excellence (CoEs) and transfer knowledge from HR/IT vendors as soon as possible so that by the time the system integrator is gone, everything does not go down the drain or deplete state coffers by resorting to expensive contractors.

- Improve planning and be fast: I know it is a challenge to circumvent government bureaucracies, but decision-making should be sped up as much as possible. Because technology changes much faster than government bureaucrats can countenance, try and break down these huge projects into smaller ones based on relatively easy to define HR processes and sub-processes.

- Develop KPIs about progress, success factors, user satisfaction and ensure these are measured adequately: all deviations should be explained and accounted for. It is nothing short of scandalous that when French Defense Minister Le Drian was asked who should be blamed for the fiasco, he replied, "it is a collective responsibility," meaning that since everybody was guilty, then nobody was. And so far, not a single head has rolled reinforcing the culture of impunity so prevalent in the public sector. Are key product features missing from the HR and payroll products? Then how come that we didn't ask the vendors to include them in their roadmap? And if we did, how come that SAP/Oracle/HR Access didn't deliver them? And if they didn't when they were supposed to, then how come they are not held accountable and being asked to pay the hefty penalties that should have been part of the contract? If the issue is one of configuration and customization, then all eyes should turn to Northrop Grumman, Steria, HR Access: did they implement the system according to specifications? If not, then they should be held accountable. Were specifications provided in a clear, thorough and timely fashion to the system integrator? If not, then government employees and contractors should be held accountable. And who took the decision to unplug the older systems which worked and replace them by the newer ones which ended up not working? As we all know, a new payroll goes live only after several parallel processes are run and all issues are fixed. Somebody must have taken that decision. Who? Why?

- Learn from others: Defense may be unique within every country, but since its roles and activities are replicated throughout the world, learning from others can yield great benefits, especially when comparing oneself with similar armies such as members of the NATO alliance.



- Start looking at the cloud: one advantage of being a laggard is that you can learn from others without paying the price of being a guinea pig. Some HR functions can be safely moved to the cloud with cost reductions and quality gains, others will require strategic product decisions by SAP, Oracle and Workday. So far none has seem ready to move their public-sector products to the cloud. A nudge from the customer would go a long way.


In summary, taxpayers, that is you and I, are right to wonder why in the private sector (well, the better managed businesses at least) to produce a payslip costs a couple of hundred dollars per year , whereas in the military the figure is closer to $1,000...when it works! How can our troops win the wars of the future (especially knowing that they will increasingly be IT-related) when they are defeated by a mere software? These are hard questions for which so far very few cogent answers have been provided.


Note # 1: As in all posts in this blog,  text, charts and diagrams are Ahmed Limam's intellectual property. They cannot be used without his written authorization.

Note # 2: The blogger's advisory and consulting experience covers all industries, including government, both national (such as defense)  and international (such as EU institutions and UN agencies- he worked five years for the latter in New York and Madrid.)

Monday, June 25, 2012

FOR SALE: Software firm HR Access going on the block

PARIS
You will not see the following ad in the Financial Times or Wall Street Journal, or any IT trade publication, but you might as well. After almost 10 years trying to shape HR Access into an outfit to serve its changing purposes, investment firm Fidelity is throwing in the towel. The software company it bought in 2003 from IBM is up for sale.

I discussed in an April 2010 post ("Is Fidelity Still in the HR Services Business?") some of the recurring problems faced by HR Access and I predicted that Fidelity would sell off the company. Two years on the problems haven't been solved and Fidelity is now actively looking for a buyer to divest itself of what has turned into a failed venture. Its dream of ever recovering the staggering amounts it has plowed into the French company are unlikely to ever materialize.



So, who is the likely buyer?

- Payroll outsourcing giant ADP could be interested (rumor has it that it did express some interest.) It has experience buying European payroll providers: as recently as 2010 it bought Logica's payroll business in the Netherlands and Italy's payroll leader, Byte. HR Access will help it expand its market share in countries where it is already a leader. But being a leader in the markets where HR Access is strong may not constitute a big incentive for them, unless the price is particularly attractive.

- SAP is also a leader in France and Italy, but less so in the payroll business. And since PeopleSoft is still strong in France, the acquisition could strengthen its hand. The fact that both SAP and HR Access have one of the largest employers in Europe as a customer (the French government - SAP for HR and HR Access for Payroll), this could be a good opportunity to consolidate both into one single project and offering. And as a European company, the cultural fit may be closer than ADP (or Fidelity for that matter.)

- Meta4 could do well with HR Access's customer base especially since they operate in the same geographies. However, Meta4 (whose business has been as stagnant as HR Access) is going through a bad patch now, so any merger would be a case of the broke leading the broke. Or Sopra, one of the top French IT services company with a well-known HR product, Pléiades.

- One cannot rule out Oracle, the serial acquirer if there ever was one. But with Oracle's focus on the cloud/SaaS business, HR Access may be too small to feature on its radar. 

- What about the various private-equity firms that have invested hundreds of millions of dollars recently acquiring HR companies? Maybe legendary KKR, owner of fellow European Northgate Arinso, could see the opportunity to increase its  market share in key European countries. Sure, that means adding  one more product (and many versions of it, to boot) but NGA's portfolio is already so large that managing a couple of additional products should not change much.


Hopefully HRA 9 is better localized than their season's greetings
(as seen on  their website on Jan. 3, 2013)
- Anybody else?

Whoever makes the move better have a good strategy in place AND ensure execution follows through, otherwise it will be yet another case in the software industry of throwing good investment money after bad.  



Monday, November 7, 2011

Error 404: Oracle Fusion not found

PARIS
As any experienced observer of our industry knows, the weaker the message a software company has on offer, the higher in the corporate hierarchy it has to go to deliver it. Oracle did not fail the tradition as a posse of vice-presidential bigwigs led by the head of its HCM development organization, descended a couple of weeks ago upon the City of Light (the home of yours truly) as part of their Fusion global roadshow.

The stakes are high. As soon as Oracle finalized its acquisition of PeopleSoft in 2005, it announced it was starting work on the successor product. Although I was among many chagrined by the demise of the jewel in our industry, I couldn't really blame Oracle: from a purely business perspective it didn't make sense to keep having several parallel products. Four years later, in 2009, there was still no Fusion on the horizon but Larry Ellison, rarely detracted by reality, famously announced that Fusion was going to be the SuccessFactors and Workday killer. More than two years later (almost six years after first announced) and with scores of Oracle and PeopleSoft customers defecting to SuccessFactors and Workday, where is Fusion?

When it was demoed at the HR Technology Conference in Chicago a year ago (see my post on it) release was announced for early 2011. Then it was pushed to the second quarter of 2011 and only in the summer was "something" finally made available.

First comment: the product is available for download, putting to rest any notion that it is SaaS-based. As anybody with a modicum of interest and knowledge in the matter knows, if you can install it on your server then it is NOT SaaS. Call it a hosted solution and the vendor an ASP or whatever alphabet soup you feel comfortable with, but SaaS it sure ain't. Also, the price list for Fusion is only available for the on-premise implementation, not the "cloud" variant which Oracle claims it has: another proof of how fuzzy and half-baked this mock-SaaS offering is.

Second, if I used "something" to describe the scope of what is available, it is not to belittle the hard work that went into it (and I know that many people did work hard on it), but it is an honest description of the functionality which is mainly based on compensation, one component of talent management, itself just one part of any overall HCM offering. Where is recruiting? (Wouldn't Fusion have been a great opportunity for Oracle to fix the double failure of its Oracle iRecruit and PeopleSoft eRecruit products?) And Learning/development? and Succession planning?

Who in their right mind would believe for a second that SuccessFactor has anything to fear from a product with such limitations? And as for Workday, it started work on their ground-breaking product at the same time as Fusion with $100 mn in seed money (Oracle makes profits in the billions), and a few dozen employees (Oracle has a cast of thousands working on Fusion - and, as few people know, this was supplemented by resources from Indian IT giant Infosys). As of today, Workday has not only delivered an entirely new HR system of record, two payrolls, strong talent functionality (even if missing some key parts), but also a financial management system. Where are Fusion's country localizations? The HR Admin, Payroll, Benefits modules may look good in demos (but what product doesn't?) but no company has selected them (let alone is running them) which is very suspicious.

To call Fusion half-baked would be very, very charitable. Rarely, if ever, in the history of software making have so many taken so long to produce so little. In less the time it took Oracle to present us with a Fusion embryo, Alexander the Great conquered the world. Now, that's perspective.

At last month's HR Technology Conference in Las Vegas, I ran into a senior Europe-based Fusion executive whom I had known for over a decade. As those who attended the event know, the South Pacific section of the conference grounds has many nooks and crannies. So, cornering my old Fusion pal into one of them, I managed to extract a confession from him.

"How many European Fusion early adopters do you have?" I asked.

"Larry will announce them tomorrow at Open World," came the less-than-assured reply.

"Come on, don't give me that marketing crap. We go back a long time. If anybody should know, it's you. For God's sake, you're based out of  Europe. So, spit it out." For those who know me, I am nothing if not tenacious. All I got, though, was an embarrassed smile.Of course, the next day at Oracle's annual jamboree Larry in an uncharacteristically lackluster performance was long on vague customer numbers, but short on actual names, and none of them from Europe.

The Paris event, a few weeks later, didn't bring any new names either. Software vendors are rarely shy about trumpeting their customer wins, especially when attached to new products to which they lend the credibility needed to succeed on the market. Sometime they even overdo it - in Europe, think of SuccessFactors and Siemens, or Workday and Aviva, to use the two competitors Larry Ellison had singled out. If Oracle, which nobody by any stretch of the imagination would call a shy, timid or bashful company, cannot produce any European customer, then you and I can only come to a single conclusion: there isn't any.

I can't say this came as a surprise to me. The dozens of Oracle and PeopleSoft customers I have asked in Europe are all unanimous: we will not touch Fusion with a ten-foot pole. Can you really blame them? Functionality that is so limited that it verges on the absurd, the less-than-glorious development and customer-support track record, the realization that Fusion apps, and HCM within them, are just a tiny part of Oracle's portfolio and, even more seriously, the doubts about the strategy behind it.

As I said earlier, the strategy to rationalize all of Oracle's acquisitions into one single product made business sense. But does this strategy devised in the first half of the past decade make sense now when much nimbler vendors  whose products have deeper functionality are churning out new releases on a  quarterly basis and five years on we are still waiting for Fusion 1.0? Does buying Sun to provide hardware and software together (as Oracle's great slogan goes) make sense when companies are increasingly going to be renting rather than buying their software needs and will therefore no longer require any servers within their corporate walls?

Fusion, and Oracle, look increasingly like today's solution to yesterday's problems. The market has moved on but the big ocean-liner is proving hard to turn around. Actually, considering that Fusion is barely here, it would be more accurate to say that Oracle and Fusion represent tomorrow's solution to yesterday's problems. 

A major French bank, BNP Paribas (160,000 employees worldwide), after pulling the plug on PeopleSoft said, "Fusion? Thanks, but no, thanks." Then, adding insult to injury, BNP went to their pre-PeopleSoft vendor, HR Access. It is worrying for Oracle to have its next-generation product rejected in favor of one based on older technology. (With SAP also being used.)

And France is not the only European country where Oracle customers are dumping Oracle, rejecting Fusion and moving to Workday. In a  recent interview in ComputerWeekly, the head of HR of UK-based insurance company Aviva, explained why he eliminated Oracle HR and selected Workday: "[with Oracle] when the CEO asked me how many staff we had in Europe, I could not tell him. It took weeks to find out. Now [with Workday] I can do that in 30 minutes." He then goes on to explain why he did not choose Fusion: "The technology was not there, Fusion was not ready, and its software-as-a-service model was not a true SaaS model." He also echoed a common complaint of Oracle customers that "communicating with Oracle was very difficult."

In several forums, I predicted that Fusion would not make any significant traction before 2015. So far, I have seen nothing to amend my analysis. And as for Mr. Ellison's claim of burying Workday or SuccessFactors, even after taking into account the typical hyperbole-prone statements so much favored by our industry, it is simply preposterous and betrays the fear that the reverse may well happen.

Tuesday, October 19, 2010

Who Will Inherit PeopleSoft's Crown?

PRAGUE
Spending a few days in the fairytale Czech capital where I presented the DOs and DON'Ts of HR technology projects at the HR Directors' International Summit, I was surprised by how many of the 150 attending HR leaders asked me which vendor I saw most likely to inherit the mantle of HR technology leader now that PeopleSoft is slowly but steadily fading into the sunset. Here is my list of pretenders to the crown of industry leader.

The official heir apparent, Fusion, touted by Oracle as the successor product, can safely be ruled out since it has yet to be born (meaning it hasn't been shipped), has no customers live on it  and from what has been shown at various events and leaked, is missing many ingredients of a global Human Capital Management-HCM (payroll, localizations, recruitment).  Could the other ERP behemoth, SAP, take over? Its qualifications are indeed stronger as they include a higher number of customers around the world and a proven HCM system which, for all its faults (overly complex, not particularly user friendly, expensive) is now well established. However, to be recognized as the undisputed HCM leader as PeopleSoft was for a good decade, requires to be a visionary and trendsetter, something nobody has ever accused SAP of being - and let's face it: most SAP customers don't choose it for its HR offering, but usually for other business functions such as Finance and Manufacturing and then adopt HR which SAP still gives the impression of having developed as an afterthought.

What about the latest kid on the block: Workday? Although they are still missing  recruitment and learning modules and are pretty thin on the localization front, they have unmistakably provided the kind of innovation not seen since the PeopleSoft days. And I'm talking here not only about their SaaS architecture (nobody has ever tried a SaaS payroll before) but also about their unique customer orientation which has all the marks of transforming the industry. However, it's still early days to say whether this promising young prince has come of age to claim the crown.

These three previous contenders are all ERP vendors (or integrated business systems to the layman.) What about HCM-only vendors? After all, when PeopleSoft came to the market it was an HR-only product which, even after it morphed into a full-fledged ERP, remained its flagship product. Could the new king come from the rank of pure HR players? In the US, Ultimate and Kronos, while established vendors with solid products, cannot be seriously considered as they  fail on both the talent-management front and globalization. Neither can Lawson, too, whose half-hearted attempts at becoming a global vendor have been met with matching results.

Could it be that the next leading HR vendor would come from the Old Continent? After all, this is where SAP hails from. Spain's Meta4 was once upon a time close to being anointed as official heir with a revolutionary object model, full HCM offering, various localizations, a visionary knowledge-management approach. It had all the makings of a king in waiting until it f(l)oundered on a string of acquisitions, buyouts, management shakeouts from which it never recovered, happy to live off its established customer-base maintenance. IBM's high hopes in France-based HR Access never materialized  and it sold it off to Fidelity which, eight years on, is still unable to develop it in its own home market of the US (Meta4 wasn't more successful there, either), and it remains mainly a payroll provider with limited HCM functionality and an old technology focusing on some European geographies. 


What about outsourcing vendors? Taking a (smaller) leaf from the Oracle book, ADP has been beefing up its offering with various acquisitions, but it still remains to be seen how it will all play out and for the time being the Grand Old Lady of Roseland can only be considered as a long, long shot in the race to the top.


Casting our net wider in our search for this elusive king maybe that some talent-management vendors, the fastest growing segment of the HCM market, could grow into a mature HCM offering with all the thought leadership required to become the industry's leader. There are indeed some amazing products in this space. Will New Zealand's Sonar6 show that the sun indeed rises in the East? Although its performance product is one of the most innovative (with a truly impressive user interface) and the company one of the most creative around, it is way too niche to ever blossom into a full-fledged HCM offering, the key prerequisite to be considered as the leader. Only integrated talent-management vendors have  the wherewithal to reach the throne, or at least the steps leading to it. Taleo? Could be, if it manages to integrate successfully its newly acquired learning offering and decides to develop an HR administration module. Will it bring something altogether new to the industry?   


And here's the rub: none of these HCM suite/integrated talent-management vendors has really brought knock-out innovation, with the exception of Workday on the delivery model and, to some extent, customer relations. Here are some ideas that current or prospective vendors could consider:


1. What about a vendor that will rearchitect their offering, or build a new one, around a new HR data model that will bring a new way of managing employees, organizations, jobs and positions? Provide the flexibility and depth of functionality along with the ease of use required by 21st-century companies?   Will SuccessFactors, a clear leader in the talent-management space (but still without a learning system)  develop such a product that would be a marked enhancement on the old data design of  "SOP" (SAP, Oracle and PeopleSoft)? 


2. What about bringing to the market a full HCM solution built along the lines of a social network? Just like when PeopleSoft introduced release 8.0 with a full internet interface: since most people were used to working with a browser why not give them an HR tool based on such an interface, was the thought then. Following the same thought process, wouldn't it be great to have an HCM solution that looks like Facebook or LinkedIn? After all, many key HR processes such as recruitment or career paths, are better done now using social networks than any other tool. (I'm not talking here about the collaboration features slapped by some vendors on their offering more for show than for substance, but of a full-fledged social HR)


3. Or a user experience ( Ă  la Sonar6, say) or quality of service/support that will at long last reconcile vendors and users? There is little doubt in my mind that whoever manages to reinvent the long-broken dialog between software provider and users will be offered the crown by legions of enthusiastic customers disillusioned by years of poor service and lousy support. 


4. What about open-source HR? So far, the only vendor that has gone down that road with some visibility has been OrangeHRM, but it still remains a very confidential offering and success for this model is far from assured. Or using Google  features (such as Google Search Appliance) for a recruitment tool whose database is the whole internet: after all, most CV's are now available for anybody's perusal on the web. Wouldn't it be great to just enter some key words in your Google search box and you get a list of relevant candidates?


5. Maybe "mobilizing" HR:  with a workforce increasingly mobile, maybe the market is ready for the first fully mobile HR offering. Again, as with social networks, I'm not talking here about redesigning a few screens so that users can fill their timesheets or do their expenses on their iPhone or Nokia (something which already exists), but having the full application written for smartphones. Just as people are spending more and more time on social networks so are they getting glued to their cell phones (even accessing the former through the latter.) What would be better than to give them the HR tools they need on their device of choice? 


6. Anything else that my limited cognitive abilities have yet to envision?


It is obvious that an indisputable leader has yet to emerge and convincingly claim PeopleSoft's crown. The King is dead, long live the King...if we can find one!

Friday, April 9, 2010

Is Fidelity Still in HR Services Business? Bank of America Ends Outsourcing Contract

RIO DE JANEIRO
Fidelity Investments' HR Services has just taken a big hit with the announcement that their flagship client, Bank of America (BofA), has decided to dump them after a lengthy review in which they compared the option of staying with them to switching to a new provider. The decision which moves payroll, timekeeping, recruiting and benefits to Hewitt (and only keeps retirement with Fidelity for the time being) prompts any observer of the HR technology and services business to wonder what is going on. After all, BofA, was Fidelity's largest and most significant client and the contract was trumpeted with loud fanfare back in 2004.

This is no accident as the project showed that Fidelity's move into outsourcing services was not matched by the required capabilities to ensure success. In particular, the choice of a technology platform has been erratic, at best. First, Fidelity, who had been using Oracle for a long time, decided to have their own technology on which they would offer outsourcing services and in 2003 they bought from IBM Paris-based software vendor HR Access. The next few years were used to implement the system for their own workforce worldwide. Hundreds of millions of dollars were spent on that effort for Fidelity only to pull the plug in 2007 and revert to Oracle for both internal needs and big clients like BofA which continued to cost them a fortune for the honor of using their logo as a major client.

Despite this setback, Fidelity continued with another project, called Global Platform, still based on HR Access but only for Europe, to start with. The secret hope being that what didn't work in the US would, as by magic, work in Europe and the miracle could then be replicated back in the US where the BofA project was still dripping ink the color of blood. In 2008, the awaited miracle didn't materialize and the Global Platform project was shelved at a cost of several dozen million dollars, to be replaced with outsourcing services from HR Access directly.

The problem is that HR Access whose DNA is HR software (or, rather, software services around implementation - a legacy of the IBM Global Services days) has limited knowledge and experience of the outsourcing business. The top managers called in to help (such as Bill Thomas, as Head of Outsourcing, from Ceridian, now with Equaterra; Ignacio Palomera, on the Product Mangement side, from Arinso) all came and left one after the other with little noticeable impact, at least of the positive variety. HR Access is still a software vendor, still European with France representing a lion's share of its revenue and (still higher) costs. Its recent multi-million-euro win to supply the French government with a customized payroll software for all its employees is actually a double edged sword: not only does it mean that heavy R&D investment will have to be made to develop a product that can't be sold to any other customer thus preventing any product capitalization, but it also draws HR Access even farther away from the outsourcing business since most of its resources will be focused on the traditional software business rather than the brave new world of outsourcing services.

In view of these developments it is safe to predict the following :

1. Unless there are some radical changes in the way the business is managed, and the technology strategy clarified, Fidelity's cash hemorrhage is going to continue until hey exit the HR Services/outsourcing business altogether. More cost effective vendors have appeared on the landscape and are stealing Fidelity's lunch.

2. HR Access, which is still an unprofitable business as it relies on a regular handout from Fidelity, will be sold back to either a private equity firm or, more likely, another HR vendor (such as SAP who lost that French government payroll deal, but are implementing an HR system for several million French government employees.) But any sale will have to be done at a loss since any new acquirer will face a serious cost control challenge. In today's globalized world and recovering economy it doesn't make sense to have expensive developers in Paris, France, building what is after all just a payroll and HR admin product for mainly the French market and smaller satelite markets.

3. HR Outsourcing is a tougher nut to crack than previously thought, and the market through 2015 will grow more slowly than the traditional on-premise licensed software or subscription-based (SaaS) model. The reason is that all vendors are still struggling with the dual challenges of how to achieve economies of scale by implementing the Holy Grail of best practices supported by truly multi-instance technology.